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In Japan, employee retirement benefits started as lump-sum severance payments
supported by the book reserve internal funds. In the 1970s and 1980s many of them
came to rely on outside pension plans for funding. Combined, these dual-type benefit
plans function as a substantial source of old-age income for 60-70 percent of all
employees working for approximately 90 percent of employers. In addition, they have
been important components of Japan’s seniority-based labor management and
compensation system. They have been used in order to make core employees stay for a
long time with a single employer.
As long-term employment and seniority-based compensation practices became not
very effective, which can clearly be seen with the rising labor distribution rate,
retirement benefits constituting compensation plans had to undergo substantial
adjustments. Declining returns on pension assets since the 1990s, and increasing
benefit obligations on balance sheets under new accounting rules put into effect in
2001 accelerated the revision of benefit plans.
The goals of this plan revision are to: (a) reduce benefit obligations, (b) maintain
consistency with other compensation plan components which are more based on job
content and performance rather than seniority, (c) make employees with short tenure
eligible for substantial benefits by alleviating backloading and by preparing individual
account under Defined Contribution Plans, and (d) lighten the burden of benefit
obligations on the balance sheet of plan sponsors and reduce investment risks.
Specifically, such measures as the revision of benefit formula and the introduction of
point -based benefits are taken. Further, the numbers of Defined Contribution Plans,
Employee Pension Funds returning contract-out portion and Cash Balance Plans, all of
which became available under two laws enacted in June 2001, have been increasing.
Public policies on retirement benefits must keep pace with these dynamic changes.
Especially, protection of benefit rights –vesting, non-forfeiting and funding
requirement, is the area which demands serious attention. Another area to be reformed
is taxation. The introduction of EET (exempt- exempt-taxable) taxation uniformly
applicable throughout various forms of retirement benefits, which is exemplified by
Canadian Registered Retirement Saving Plan, should be taken into serious
consideration.
Introduction
As often pointed out in the literature such as Davis ʢ1995ʣ , retirement benefit plans perform
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several economic functions. First, they are the tools for labor management, and second, they
accrue legal and economic obligations. To satisfy these obligations, company pensions hold
and manage assets and function as institutional investors.
Government has its own interests in retirement benefits. Public policies in such fields as labor
relationship, financial contracts, social securities, and tax privileged savings, are related to
retirement benefits.
Corresponding to the inauguration of the Japan Pension Research Council, this paper will
explore and comment on current conditions by viewing these aspects. Specifically, after
providing an overview of Japan’s retirement benefits in section 1, a description of the status
of retirement benefits and issues corporate management is facing will be presented in sections
2. Recent reform movements to address these issues will be explained in section 3, with
commentary on the significance of such reforms to public policies in Section 4. Section 5 is a
summary.
1. Overview of Japan’s Retirement Benefits
Employees receive two types of retirement benefits employees upon termination of
employment or retirement: one-time severance payments, and company pensions. In this
paper, these will be collectively referred to as “retirement benefits.” An overview of the
current situation is provided below.
1.1 History of Retirement Benefits
Severance payments began to spread between 1910 and 1920. In many large companies, they
came to be paid not only to executives, but also to general employees, including factory
workers. During the economic boom around 1920 (during the Taisho Era), such payments
were used as a tool to induce workers to stay with their employers, but during the recessionary
period in the latter half of the 1920s they were more often used as compensation for forced
termination benefits. In 1936, the Retirement Allowance Reserve and Retirement Payment
Law was enacted, mandating severance payments by companies with 50 or more regular
employees, to be paid for involuntary terminations. For the funding provision, it mandated
both employer and employee to pay 2% of wages.
During the Second World War, a shortage of labor resulted in the elimination of terminations,
making severance payments superfluous. In addition, the establishment of a public pension
with the Workers Pension Insurance (1942) and its successor, Employee Pension Insurance
(1944), diminished the necessity of employer’s retirement benefits. Ultimately, the Retirement
Allowance Reserve and Retirement Payment Law was absorbed into the Employee Pension
Insurance Law in 1945.
Due to postwar inflation, however, benefits paid under Employee Pension Insurance (EPI)
became insignificant, and many companies—including those that were not large—started to
pay new retirement benefits. By 1956, according to a study by the Ministry of Health Labor,
and Welfare, 97 percent of businesses with 500 employees or more, and 60 to 70 percent of
other businesses, had rules for severance payment plans.
Funding for severance payment plans was not supplied from externally accumulated assets,
but from book reserves. As severance payments became a general practice, however, an
increasing number of large companies began to introduce pension benefits that used externally
accumulated assets for funding. As a result, in 1962 Tax Qualified Pension Plans (TQPPs)3
were introduced, and contributions to them were recognized as expenses for tax purposes.
Meanwhile, one impetus to the introduction of Employee Pension Funds as an “Adjustment
Pension” was the increase in the level of EPI from a paltry level to 10,000 yen per month in
1965. This brought about an increase in social security taxes for EPI, and management’s
demand for the elimination of the dual burden of severance payments and public pensions
became more pronounced.
As a result, a system was introduced in 1966.whereby administration and investment of the
income-related portion of Employee Pension Insurance was transferred from the government
to company pensions to adjust for double burden (referred to as “contract-out”). The entity
established to perform this function was the Employee Pension Fund (EPF). Since that time,
the four retirement benefit programs—severance payments, Tax Qualified Pension Plans,
Employee Pension Funds, and the Small and Medium Scale Enterprise Mutual Aid Scheme
for Retirement Allowance, established in 1959—have been the pillars of retirement benefits.
Another issue that arose in this process in the 1950s and 60s was about the legal status of
retirement benefits. Management at the time took the position that such benefits constituted
merit-based compensation, while labor unions contended that they were deferred wages.
The merit-based compensation theory states that retirement benefits are payments made at
management’s discretion to meritorious employees. The amount of benefits reflects the level
of service rendered by the employee. On the other hand, the deferred wage theory contends
that retirement benefits are purely the payment of a part of wages not payable during the term
of employment, but deferred until the time of retirement and/or job termination.
Ultimately, the concept of retirement benefits as being deferred wages did not take root in
Japan. This point plays a significant role in the issues concerning the degree of protection of
benefits as well as their treatment under the new accounting standards.
1.2 Book Reserve vs. Asset Accumulation
The funding provision for retirement benefits continues to be a combination of severance
payments out of book reserves, and pensions paid out of accumulated assets. According to the
Comprehensive Survey on Wages and Labor Hours (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare,
(1998)), 47.5 percent of companies use only the book reserve system, 20.3 percent of
companies use the pension system only (book reserve severance payments converted entirely
to pension plans), while 32.2 percent use a combination of the two systems (a portion of
severance payments converted to pension plans).
Usually, in the labor contract, the aggregate amount of severance payments and the present
value of pension payments is determined by multiplying base wages at the time of severance
by the loading rate, depending on the reason for the severance (whether voluntary or
involuntary, or reaching retirement age) and the number of service years as follows:
R = W (Wages)  ʷ L  (Loading)
Then the labor contract stipulates how much of that aggregate amount is paid from pension
plans. In other words, the total amount of retirement benefits is decided first, and then under
the pension system a certain portion of this amount is converted into annuity payments using a
certain interest rate (the assumed rate of interest for benefit payments). Employers adopt the
EPFs or TQPPs as provisions in order to pay proportion of this total amount. Therefore, if
accumulated assets are insufficient to meet company pension amount, employees have the
right to demand the employer to pay the full amount of retirement benefits and make up for
the deficiency in total retirement benefits.4
In actuality, there are many cases in which the benefits from the pension plans are paid as a
lump sum: 95.9 percent of pensions allow for the receipt of a lump-sum payment, and 58.6
percent of beneficiaries who have long years of service choose to take the whole amount as a
lump sum, while 10.2 percent take a portion of the benefits from pension plans as a lump sum.
As a result, over 80 percent of total retirement benefits are received as lump sums (see Table
1). In addition, in general, pension plans require a minimum of 20 years of service to qualify
for annuity payment, but to employees with short service, benefits are paid out of
accumulated assets in a lump sum.
<Please insert Table 1 here. >
Therefore, if we classify retirement benefits by method of payment, lump sum components
consist of severance payment and lump sum from pension plans as well, and annuity
components come from pension plans. As such, for the purpose of labor management, the
function of company pensions in Japan must be looked at together with severance payments.
1.3 High Rate of Saturation and the Disparities due to Company Size
According to the Comprehensive Survey on Wages and Labor Hours, as of 1998, 88.9 percent
of companies with 30 or more employees provided retirement benefits to full-time employees.
Of the 44 million (1999 average) employees in the private sector, 31 million are full-time,
while the percentage of part-time, temporary, and agency personnel (13 million) eligible for
retirement benefits is less than 10 percent.
There is also a disparity by company size. In companies with 1,000 or more employees, 99.5
percent provide retirement benefits, as do 95.9 percent of those with 100 to 299 employees,
but the rate declines to 85.7 percent for companies with 30-99 employees, and it is likely that
this proportion falls below 80 percent for companies who have less than 30 employees.
At companies with 1,000 or more employees, average retirement benefits actually disbursed
(sum of severance payment, and present value of pension payments) to those with 35 or more
years of service amounts to 34 million yen for university graduates, and 20 million for high
school graduates. In contrast, in companies with 100-299 employees, the retirement benefits
received average 20.46 million yen for university graduates, while high school graduates
receive 14.28 million.
In the U.S., 79 percent of medium and large companies provide pension plans, compared with
only 46 percent of small companies (with 100 or fewer employees). In addition, as seen in
Table 2, only 46.8 percent of waged workers, and 60.8 percent of full-time workers, are
enrolled in pension plans. Of all private sector full-time employees, 55.8 percent are enrolled
in pension plans.
3
<Please insert Table 2 here. >
With respect to benefit levels, as of 1993, the pension received by workers with 30 years or
more of service was equivalent to 21-27 percent of their final salary (Mitchell (1999)).
Calculated with a 6 percent yield on a 10-year Treasury bond, and an average 18-year life
expectancy after the standard retirement age of 62 (Life Insurance Fact Book (1998),
American Council of Life Insurers,), an annuity payment equivalent to 25 percent of the final
salary would, on a present-value basis, be worth 46 months of final salary (assuming annual
payments). In Japan’s case, if large companies hire employees upon graduation, according to
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model retirement statistics,
4 total value of benefits they would receive upon retirement is also
equivalent to 45-50 months of final monthly salary. On this particular point, there is no major
difference.
1.4 Role of Retirement Benefits in Retirement Income
The role of retirement benefits in old age income security is discussed as the final topic of this
section. Company’s benefits supplement basic public pension, and individual pensions and
insurance supplement these two. An examination of annual income flows of the elderly shows
that the portion of private pension is low. In households with their house- heads of age 65 and
older, of 3.29 million yen in total income, public pension accounts for 2.03 million yen (61.8
percent), while “other income” (presumed to include company pension annuities) comprises
only 60,000 yen (2 percent).
5 However, this is presumably because employees receive a large
proportion of retirement benefits in lump sum.
An examination of the Saving Trend Survey Yearbook ʢ2000ʣ (Ministry of Public Management,
Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications) reveals that the net financial assets (savings
less liabilities) of workers household increases from 9.74 million yen for those age 50 to 54,
to 21.52 million yen for those age 60 to 64. It can be inferred that severance payments and/or
lump-sum receipts from pension funds have been set aside as a reserve to provide for
contingencies.
For example, on an average university graduates who have reached retirement age after 20 or
more years of service receives 28.71 million yen in retirement benefits, while high school
graduates (production workers) receive 13.52 million yen (Comprehensive Survey on Wages
and Working Hours). Using an average male life expectancy of 20 years after the age of 60
(taken from the Abridged Life Expectancy Table, The Life Insurance Association of Japan,
(1998)), and converting these amounts into an annuity with a 3.0 percent interest rate,
produces an annuity payment of 1.87 million yen and 880,000 yen, respectively. This equals
95 and 37 percent of the average benefit level of the EPI worth 2.4 million yen (for males in
1997). While public pensions comprise 60 percent of income after retirement, converting all
retirement benefits into an annuity will produce 40 to 20 percent of total income.
In the U.S., private pensions account for roughly 20 percent of the income of elderly
households (McDonnell, 1999). Thus if the lump sum component is added to the annuity, we
see that the possible role played by Japan’s retirement benefits in old age is not insignificant.
2. Reform Trends of Company Retirement Benefits
This section discusses changes in the circumstances surrounding retirement benefits that have
prompted companies to undertake reforms.
2.1 Retirement Benefits as a Tool in Labor Management, and their Changing Function
2.1.1 Function of Retirement Benefits in Labor Management
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Retirement benefits are one component of a corporation’s personnel and compensation system,
possessing the objectives of inducing long tenure; encouraging employees’ retirement in their    
50s; and preventing misconduct. Plotting the average model retirement benefits payable by
290 large corporations for voluntary job termination (sum of severance and the present value
of the pension at time of job termination) for university-graduate administrative/technical
personnel from the time of entry produces an “S” shaped curve, as shown in Chart 1. The
amount shows very little increase until they reach their mid-30s, and increases rapidly through
the period of their 40s, then flattening out in their 50s until they reach the retirement age of
60.
<Please insert Chart 1 here. >
To measure the effect on tenure however, it is necessary to take into consideration the
interests on the amount of benefits. If “Rt” represents the retirement benefits amount at
service year “t,” the retirement benefit paid in the following year would be “Rt+1.” The
differential of the two amounts would include one year of interest, and thus if “At+1”
represents the benefit amount accrued due to one year of service, then
At+1 = Rt+1 – Rt (1ʴr),    with “r” representing the interest rate.
Table 3 shows the results of computation of accrued benefits “A”, assuming an interest rate of
3 percent and using the same data as Chart 1. Up through the mid-30s the annual accrual
amount does not reach 300,000 yen, however, the annual accrual at the peak years—around
age of 50—exceeds 1 million yen. Accruals begin to decline after this time, and after the age
55 comes a negative accrual. At this point, after subtracting interests, the longer one continues
to work, the lower the retirement benefits.
<Please insert Table 3 here. >
Also, looking at the proportion (loading factor “lt”) of accruals against the monthly wage
(“W”) of that age, in Table 3, which is the basis of benefit calculation, while it is 0.2-0.4 at the
time of entry, at the peak around age 50 it becomes 1.5-1.8 times, after which it becomes
negative.
In other words, until the age of 55 not only is the wage scale based on seniority, so is the
loading factor. As a result, accrued benefits are backloaded even more than wages. On the
other hand, although the loading increases after 55, as the wages which are the basis of
retirement-benefits computation decline, the marginal increase in benefits (=Rt+1 – Rt ) is
smaller than the interest proportion (=Rt (1ʴr)), and thus accrued benefit “A” becomes
negative.
If retirement benefit amounts show such increases and decreases, a career change before the
age of about 50 is clearly disadvantageous. But after the age of 55, when accrued benefit “A”
becomes negative, looking only at retirement benefits, the advantage of leaving jobs increase.
It is permitted in Japan to set a mandatory retirement age in labor contracts, while several
rigorous conditions must be satisfied for an employer to lay-off employees.
6 That benefit
curve indicates employers are not too willing to maintain employees after age 55, although the
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lowest retirement age allowed by law was raised from 55 to 60 in 1990s. Hence, both the
backloaded benefit curve until 50s and Negative accrued benefits between 55 and 60 have
function to control the timing of retirement.
The third effect from the labor management point of view is the prevention of misconduct. In
Japan, under either the book reserve system or accumulated asset pension system, forfeiture or
confiscation of retirement benefits is allowed in cases of disciplinary discharge.
2.1.2 Diversification of Employment Practices
Retirement benefits have played important function in labor management. Due to slumping
corporate profitability since the 1990s, however, corporations have begun to review their
employment practices.
One factor behind poor profitability has been the rise in the allocation to labor. The share of
personnel expenses in value-added of non-manufacturing corporate sector rose from 68
percent in the 1970s (on average), to 71 percent in the 1980s, and 73 percent in the 1990s
(Statistical Yearbook of Corporations, Ministry of Finance). The manufacturing sector
exhibits a higher rise of 6.4 percent compared with 4.3 percent for non-manufacturing.
Particularly, in manufacturing companies capitalized at 1 billion yen or more, there has been
an even larger rise of 8.6 percent (Table 4).
<Please insert Table 4 here. >
The increase in labor’s share signifies both the stagnation of added value, the denominator,
and the increase in personnel expenses, the numerator. One factor analysis of labor
distribution rate shows (Table 5) that the reason for the increase in the share of labor in large
companies from late1980s to early 1990s was a decline in labor productivity. By the latter
1990s, however, as a result of personnel cuts under corporate restructuring, productivity
rebounded and began to rise. An increase in per capita personnel expenses and a negative
price deflator, however, have offset most of this. As a result, improvements in productivity
failed to reduce the high share of labor.
<Please insert Table 5 here. >
One factor for the continued increase in per capita personnel expenses has been the aging of
the workforce. Under the seniority wage system, as the proportion of older workers increases,
personnel expenses (the numerator in the relative share of labor) grow. In reality, looking at
the employee composition of companies with 1,000 or more employees, the proportion of
university graduates over the age of 50 has increased from 4.3 percent in 1977 to 14.5 percent
recently, while that of high school graduates has increased more dramatically from 1.9 to 15.9
percent during the same period. Furthermore, among employees over age 50, 40 percent of
university graduates have 30 years or more service, compared to 70 percent for high school
graduates (Table 6).
<Please insert Table 6 here. >
Employers took measures to alleviate the effect of this rise in cost. For example, seniority
based wage profile curve was flattened (Chart 2) especially in case of university graduate
employees. In 1987, the average annual wage of employees between the ages of 50 and 55
was 5.4 times that of those between 22 and 24. This multiple fell to 4.4 times in 2001. This
decline, however, was not sufficient to compensate for the declining profitability caused by
rising costs and shrinkage in business opportunities to capitalize long-term employment
explained as follows. This is evidenced by the rise in the allocation to labor. In addition to8
modifying wages, employers have been forced to further revise and streamline all components
of seniority-based compensation including retirement benefits.
<Please insert Chart 2 here. >
On the other hand, the opportunities to reap the benefits of company-specific expertise
garnered through long periods of employment have been diminishing, as the relative position
of the manufacturing sector, in which fostering of expertise specific to individual companies
(principally among blue-collar workers) could play a role in establishing competitive
advantage, has declined. This is a manifestation of the economy moving toward services
and/or tertiary industries. Further, with advances in IT, in both manufacturing and non-
manufacturing alike, much of white-collar workers’ tasks have been mechanized, reducing the
usefulness of expertise nurtured in the past. Longer tenure can not raise skill levels
accompanied with  increased labor productivity (value added).This is an issue of the
denominator side.
Faced with such conditions, corporate management has begun to take a second look at their
compensation systems, with the first aim being the reduction of direct personnel expenses.
First, the number of companies that have taken steps to reduce the level of wages—not merely
limited to reductions in bonuses and periodic wage increases in every April—is not small.
There are companies that have taken measures to encourage early retirement by employees in
their 40s and 50s making use of voluntary retirement programs with additional severance
payments
Second is a shift from seniority-based compensation to a new system that reflects job content
and performance. Under the “Job Capacity Qualification” system of wages, which many
companies adopted in the past, it was supposed that employees are promoted based on their
capacity to serve job assignments. However, after serving in one qualification category for a
certain period, employees were almost automatically deemed to have capacity for higher job
qualification and promoted to that. In actuality, this was very close to the seniority system. In
place of this system, there has been a trend toward introducing job or work-based salaries
where, without regard to age or seniority, wages are set according to job content and
productivity.
The third measure is the hiring of seasonal, part-time, and temporary workers positioned
outside the seniority-based wage system. The percentage of part-time workers rose from 11.1
percent in 1990 to 27.7 percent in 2000 (in companies with employees of 1,000 or more, from
6.7 to 15.5 percent). As a result, turnover in the overall workforce has also increased. As in
the case of outsourcing engineers for software development, term-defined employment of
skilled experts has been increasing.
The review of the compensation system had its beginnings in wages. This then spread to
retirement benefits, raising the issues of reducing overall levels, eliminating the seniority
factor, and addressing the increased use of term-defined workers.
2.2 Changes in the Financial Environment: An Increasing Burden
Another function of retirement benefits is that of institutional investors, i.e., on the liability
side of the balance sheet (credit) there is a retirement benefit liability, and providing funding
for this is financial assets on the asset (debit) side. In this aspect also, the environment
surrounding retirement benefits has been undergoing changes.9
2.2.1 Increased Contributions
Outstanding investment of company pensions, comprised of Employee Pension Funds
including contract-out portions and Tax-Qualified Pension Plans equals to 58 trillion yen and
22 trillion yen respectively, totaling 81 trillion yen at the end of March 2002.
7
At one time, allocation of this investment was subject to numerical legal restriction known as
“5.3.3.2
8.” This was eliminated in the latter half of 1990s, and now allocation is completely
liberalized. The current allocation is 29.4 percent for domestic bonds and 23.8 percent for
equities, while overseas securities comprise 19.6 percent (Table 7).
<Please insert Table 7 here. >
In addition to the liberalization of asset allocation, the responsibilities of plan administrators
and financial institutions as fiduciaries are becoming clarified. For example, the Employee
Pension Insurance Law and its guidelines make express the requirements under fiduciary
responsibility for directors of Employee Pension Funds and investing institutions. Those
clauses include the duty of loyalty and exercise of due care. Furthermore, in the Defined
Contribution Plan Law and the Defined Benefit Corporate Pension Plan Law (both enacted in
2001), the duty of loyalty, requiring the execution of business for the exclusive benefit of plan
participants, are made explicit.
As for actual investment returns, however, due to sluggish equity prices and low interest rate
policies, the rate of return of Employee Pension Funds since the 1990s has been depressed,
averaging 3.1 percent annually. Looking at 5-year intervals, the 6.5 percent return in the latter
half of the 1980s declined to 5.0 percent in the first half of the 1990s, due to unfavorable
equity markets and declining interest rates. This further declined to 2.9 percent in the latter
half of the 1990s (Chart 3). Looking at real rate of return by deducting the rate of CPI
increases, the degree is reduced, but this does not alter the fact that it has declined.
<Please insert Chart 3 here. >
Combined with the increase in the number of recipients of severance benefits, this added
burden on companies. According to a study of benefit expenses conducted by the Japan
Federation of Employers’ Association, the portion accounted for by retirement expenses (sum
of severance benefit payments and contributions to pension plans) in total compensation rose
from 4 percent in the 1970s to almost 10 percent in the 1990s.
2.2.2 Increased Debt Obligation under New Accounting Standards
Another financial change that has taken place is the introduction of new accounting standards
for retirement benefits. In the previous corporate accounting standards, under the company
pension system the cash amounts of employer’s contribution was recorded as expenses during
the period, when that contribution was made and no pension benefit obligation was recorded
as a liability on the balance sheet.
Treatment of severance payment was different from that of pension plan. In the severance
payment system, a certain proportion of total benefits payable stipulated as tax-free reserve
under the tax law was recognized in reserves for retirement allowances. In this case, expenses
during the period are the incremental portions in reserves from the ending balance of the prior
period.
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Under the new accounting standards, adopted from the fiscal year ending after March 2000,
accrued liability for both pension and severance payments are recorded on companies’
balance sheets. For example, assuming on average 30 million yen of benefits are to be paid to
an employee with an average service of 30 years at the time of retirement, obligations of 1
million yen—30 million yen divided by 30 years—are deemed to accrue annually. The
difference between the present value of this projected benefit obligation accumulated and
pension plan’s assets is recorded on the liability side of the balance sheet, as a reserve for
retirement allowances.
In Japan, the concept of retirement benefits being deferred payment of wages—i.e.,
employee’s claim and company’s obligation—has not completely taken root. From an actual
legal perspective, the obligation (and claim) for retirement benefits is deemed to come into
existence only at job termination of the employee. Until that time the amount of these benefits
may be reduced. Under the new corporate accounting standards, however, even before the
legal obligation or claim comes into existence, it must be recorded on the balance sheet as a
“constructive obligation” which has a high probability of being paid.
Examining the conditions of 1,024 companies listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange
9 (with a total of 8.8 million employees), in the fiscal year ending March 2001 the
retirement benefit obligation was 73.9 trillion yen. Against this, the asset value was 39.9
trillion yen, or 54% of the obligation, leaving the differential of 34.0 trillion yen as unfunded
liabilities. Of this, 23.2 trillion yen was recorded as accrued benefit costs, recognized as
liabilities on the balance sheet. Thus the unrecognized liabilities that must be recorded in
coming years were 10.8 trillion yen. On the income statement, periodic benefit costs were
recorded as 10.7 trillion yen. This amount corresponded to 122.5% of recurring profits, which
means profits would have doubled without benefits costs (see Table 8).
<Please insert Table 8 here. >
In the next fiscal year ending March 2002, periodic benefit costs declined by 42% to 6.2
trillion yen, mainly because recognition of transition obligations shrank to 0.9 trillion from
6.7 trillion yen in the previous year. Benefit obligations, however, grew by 7.5%, because of
the discount rate decline brought about by lower market rates. On top of that, negative returns
on assets exacerbated the funding status, which increased contribution could not compensate.
As a result, the net shortage of funds and unrecognized portion of benefit obligations
increased by 14.6% (4.9 trillion yen) and 32.8% (3.6 trillion yen) respectively.
The new accounting rules which revealed severe underfunding in 2001 made corporate
executives recognize the burden of increasing unfunded liabilities in 2002.
If we compare this with U.S. companies (Table 9), the amount of this burden can be seen. In
contrast with Japanese companies, until a few years ago U.S. companies had a surplus of
assets over projected benefit obligations and as a result an asset rather than a liability has been
recorded on the balance sheet and rather than an expense, a profit (negative expense) has been
recorded in income statement.
<Please insert Table 9 here. >
2.2.3 Reasons for the Funding Shortage
One reason for such large unfunded liabilities of Japanese corporations is the continued
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existence of the internal book reserve system for retirement benefits. Only about half of large
companies retirement benefits have funding in pension plans, and the rest of benefits remain
to be in book reserve plans with no funding whatsoever. When the number of retirees
increases, the amount of cash expenditures also increase, if there are no funded assets. In
addition, the funding deficiencies (i.e., liabilities on the accounting books) increase, and since
there is no investment income from the investment of assets, the net retirement benefit
expense increases.
Under the tax law, the contributions made for pensions are recognized as expenses for a
company, and derived interest is also tax exempt
10. From the perspective of corporate finance
theory, a funded pension system is more favorable than a book reserve system, and in the
pension system the faster the rate of funding, the more favorable it should be for valuation of
the company stocks.
In spite of this, management has been less than enthusiastic in introducing the pension system
and making contributions for funding liabilities. Possible reasons for this include a low level
of recognition of the tax effects; a desire to retain the option to decrease payments in the
future; and a wish to avoid the investment risks of depressed asset prices. If the second one is
verified, it would imply that while retirement benefits are positioned as deferred payment of
wages under the new accounting standards, management considers it possible not to pay
retirement benefits and extinguish obligations depending upon corporate performance and
financial conditions.
The second reason for the burden on Japanese corporations is that even when a transition was
made to pension systems, funding did not keep pace. Generally, funding rules were lax. The
minimum funding rule for the termination liabilities was not established until the late 1990s.
As of March 2001, out of all 1,800 EPFs, 34 percent were underfunded (accumulated assets
were short of the required level at the time of plan termination, and 1.3 times the minimum
actuarial liabilities for the contract-out portion). In addition, the maximum amount of past
service obligations (i.e., underfunding) amortized in one year or the shortest period for such
amortization is legally limited, all of which placed limitations on early funding.
3. Corporate Efforts to Reform Retirement Benefits
3.1 Defined Contribution and New Defined Benefit Plans
To resolve the issues raised in Section 2 above, companies have become active in taking
measures to review their retirement benefit systems. This has been accelerated by the
enactment of two laws, the Defined Contribution Plan Law and the Defined Benefit Corporate
Pension Plan Law, which provide additional options for retirement benefit plans.
3.1.1 Defined Contribution Plans
The Defined Contribution Plan Law came into effect in October 2001, and the establishment
of several DC plans was approved by the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare in December
that year.
In Japan there are two types of defined contribution plans: a company type in which the
                                                
10 Although suspended until fiscal 2002, in case of Tax Qualified Pension Plans and defined contribution plans a special
corporate tax of 1.173 percent is assessed on outstanding assets.12
company introduces the system company-wide, and makes contributions for employees; and
an individual type, administered by National Pension Fund Association, in which individuals
make contributions to the plan from their income. The combination of both is prohibited, and
the predominant one is the company type.
Most employers introducing defined contribution plans have selected the company type.
These were at first mostly limited to large companies, but have gradually spread to small and
medium enterprises. At the end of December 2002, 233 companies had adopted company type
DC plans with 274,000 participants
11.
According to the classification by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, of the 233
company type plans (Table 10): 60.5% of sponsors (141 plans)had less than 300 employees,
16.7% (39 plans) had between 300 and 1000 employees, and 22.7% (53 plans) had 1,000 or
more employees.
<Please insert Table 10 here. >
The adoption of the company type plan can take several forms: eliminate a portion of the
book reserve severance payment, and adopt the plan in its place; eliminate TQPPs and
rollover assets to defined contribution plans; withdraw from or dissolve EPFs, and adopt the
plan in its place; or adopt the plan as a new and additional retirement benefit.
At the time of adoption, employers can transfer pension assets to each employee’s account in
defined contribution plans. With this rollover of assets, benefit obligations in defined benefit
plans disappear.
12 Even in cases of book reserve severance payment, an employer can erase
benefit obligations by contributing the fair value of that obligation within 3 to 8 years after
inception of the defined contribution plan.
Out of 233 plans in Table 10, 52.8% (123 plans) were established as new benefits plans,
27.9% (65 plans) were rolled over from TQPPs, 9.9% (23 plans) replaced book reserve
severance payment, 7.3% (17 plans) replaced combined plans of TQPPs and book reserve,
and 2.1% (5 plans) replaced EPFs in one way or other.
In these company type plans, the formula to decide the contribution amount is stipulated in
plan by-laws. The benefit must be flat amount or be fixed percentage of participant’s monthly
salary . However, there are also cases where employees have the option to have the employer
pay the amount as a pension contribution or cash wage. In a few companies, the plan admits
more than two options to employees, as is explained later.
A plan must provide participants with three or more investment options to and at least one of
them must be a financial product of which principal is secured such as deposits, bonds and
GICs. Plan participants must choose an investment vehicle on their own behalf.
What, then, is the objective of adoption? Among large companies, many adopt the defined
contribution pension plan for its financial features: no liabilities (i.e., reserve for retirement
allowance) to be recorded on financial reports, and no risk of volatility in the amounts of
retirement benefit liabilities or contributions resulting from changes in discount rate or return
on pension asset.
In most DC plans, which replaced some other types of retirement benefit plans, the assumed
rate of return on contributed money ranges from 2.0% to 3.0% per annum. According to our
colleagues in Nippon Life Insurance Company, one of the leading DC providers, these rates
                                                
11 The number of people enrolled in individual type was only 8 thousand at that time.
12 To implement rollover, EPFs and TQPPs must be fully funded. This can, however , be achieved by the reduction of benefits
as well as by additional contributions.13
are based on the past 5 to 10 year experiences of interest rates. Then, an amount of
contribution is calculated so that the sum of contributions yielding compounded interests at
the assumed rate through the retirement age, reaches the amount of former plan benefits.
However, par-yields of government bonds with maturity of 10 and 20 year were 1.33% and
1.95% respectively on average in 2001 and have still been declining. It means an employee is
forced to invest in riskier asset and attain risk premium over government bonds, if she wants
to acquire the same amount of retirement benefits with plans replaced by DC plans. In that
sense, an employer shifted the burden of investment risk to employees.
Of course, there are a few exceptions. In Toyota Motor Corporation’s case, severance
payments (book reserve system) and the present value of the defined benefit pension (EPF)
were designed to account for a 50:50 ratio at the time of retirement. They recently amended
this to include one quarter of the severance payments to be converted in defined contribution
plans. Total retirement benefits are comprised of 50% defined benefit, 37.5% severance
payment and 12.5% defined contribution.
Toyota designed this new plan so that a stream of contributions, if parked and rolled over
every year at 1-year bank time deposit, until the retirement age and then added to severance
payment, will be the same total benefits as could have been received under the previous 50%
severance payment plan. In other words, Toyota will make adjustments to the amount of
severance payment depending on the course of interest rate movements. There is virtually no
transference of employer’s investment risk to an employee.
One reason for adopting a defined contribution plan, from the viewpoint of personnel and
compensation management, is to lessen impediments to job changing. In Japan, unlike the
U.S., the issue of portability has not been of crucial importance. Those leaving employment
can receive severance payments immediately from the book reserve. In addition, even if the
number of years of pension plan participation was insufficient to be vested with benefit rights,
benefits could be provided with in a lump sum from the pension system.
An obstacle to job changing in Japan has been the backloading described earlier, where the
total amount of benefits was limited if the length of service was insufficient. Under the
Defined Contribution Plan Law, however, the contribution amount must be defined as a flat
amount or as a fixed percentage of the wage, or by some other essentially similar method
(Article 4, Clause 3). By this, backloading in severance payments and defined benefit plans
was eliminated, ameliorating the disadvantages to those leaving the company after a short
length of service.
Another objective, from the viewpoint of labor management policy, is to encourage
employees to make their own plans for old age. Under the defined contribution plan, the
balance of each person’s account is known, and the amount of contributions by the company
into that account is known. By knowing the balances of their own accounts, employees can
make their own investment decisions, thereby reducing reliance upon the employer’s
paternalistic income protection.
In particular, in an increasing number of cases, employees are given the choice of receiving a
fixed amount as a contribution to the pension plan, or as wages. Such cases are similar to the
choice of cash or deferred payments under the 401k plan in the U.S. For example, in an
apparel sales company named First Retailing, employees can choose from among eight
patterns for receiving a total of 36,000 yen in cash wages and contributions.
13
                                                
13 Amount of contribution can be one of eight alternatives: 100, 5,000, 10,000, 15,000, 20,000, 25,000, 30,000 and 36,000
yen and the difference subtracted from 36,000 yen is the amount of the cash wage.14
Issues to be addressed in going forward with this defined contribution plan need nonetheless
to be raised. First, except for death and disability, funds cannot be withdrawn until the age of
60. This liquidity constraint is most acutely felt by younger employees.
Second, although it is possible to transfer funds between defined contribution plans when an
employee changes jobs, it is not possible to transfer funds accepted as severance payment or
lump-sum payment from defined benefit plans into defined contribution plans in another
company-type or individual-type plan administered by the National Pension Fund
Association.
Third, maximum amount of annual contribution is 432,000 yen for employees under no
defined benefits plans and 216,000 yen under a defined benefits plans of the same employer.
Even if contribution up to this ceiling is made and increased by compound interest rate, it can
not reach 20 to 30 million yenʕthe amount of total retirement benefits in large companies.
3.1.2 Cash Balance Plan
With the implementation of the Defined Benefit Corporate Pension Plan Law in April 2002,
the establishment of the Cash Balance Plan was approved, drawing much interest from
companies. Such companies as Matsushita Electric Industrial have adopted this plan. Under
this system, credits accruing from service in each period are added to credits that represent the
interest on the credits accumulated through the prior period, to compute the retirement benefit
amount.
According to the Defined Benefit Corporate Pension Plan Law Enforcement Decree, similar
to the contribution amount in defined contribution plan, the accruing service credits under this
system are computed either as a flat amount per annum, a specific percentage point of wages,
or some other essentially similar method. If this is the case, it is not possible to design a curve
that is more disadvantageous for the person terminating employment with short tenure than is
the case for the wage curve. In addition, there is an individual account for each employee,
where credits are accumulated, and thus the amount of compensation paid by the company is
explicitly revealed. Therefore, from the point of view of labor management, this is similar to
defined contribution plans, and is generally more advantageous to people changing careers
than the traditional retirement benefit system.
In spite of the above, there is no account in which an employee can transfer benefits received
from an account at the time of job termination, and then continue to invest them on a tax free
basis. In this respect, in comparison with the defined contribution plan, it is disadvantageous
for people changing careers.
On the financial side, this is categorized as a defined benefit plan, but the interest rate risks for
employer can be reduced in comparison with the traditional retirement benefit plans. The
interest rate used in assigning interest credits—referred to as the “revaluation rate”—must be
fixed, or the yield on government bonds, or a combination of the two (such as the government
bond yield plus 1 percent). If the government bond yield is used as the basis, the revaluation
rate can be amended periodically, reflecting prevailing market conditions. If interest rates
decline, the revaluation rate will decline, and if the service credit is fixed, the interest credits
will consequently decline, resulting in reduced benefits. After the beginning of annuity
payments the assumed interest rate can also be adjusted to increase or decrease annuity
amounts. Simply stated, from both an economic and accounting point of view, duration of the
benefit liabilities is shortened and the sensitivity of obligation value to interest movements is
lessened. It can also be said that the cash balance plan transfers the interest rate risk to
employees.15
3.1.3 New Defined Benefit Plan
Under the Defined Benefit Corporate Pension Plan Law, it is approved for employers to put
back obligations and assets in the contract-out portion of Employee Pension Funds. This law
added two types of defined benefit plans: contract-type and fund-type. With this addition we
now have three types of defined benefit plans—the contract-type and fund-type defined
benefit plans, and Employee Pension Funds (Chart 4). Based on this, the former Employee
Pension Funds can put back the contract-out portion to the government, and change to the
contract-type or fund-type without the contract-out portion. Existing Tax Qualified Pension
Plans must convert to one of the three types within a 10-year transition period.
<Please insert Chart 4 here. >
As the assumed rate of interest for the rebate premium received from the government to
manage the contract-out portion had been set at 5.5 percent per annum which was much lower
than the prevailing rate at the market, employers maintaining the contract-out portion came to
suffer losses (i.e., interest rate differential loss). In addition, under the new accounting
standards, the contract-out portions were included in companies’ liabilities. Furthermore, the
discount rate used is lower than the 5.5 percent, causing large liabilities to be recorded for an
accounting purpose. In addition, because of their semi-public nature, rules for the design,
administration and management of EPFs tend to be inflexible.
14 Operating costs incurred,
including those for the computation of premiums and benefits, are not small. Citing the
foregoing, an increasing number of EPF sponsor companies have voiced their desire to escape
from these burdens of contract-out.
In the past, the only way to escape the burdens of the contract-out portion was to dissolve the
employee pension plan. If dissolved, the accumulated assets to pay the company’s own
portion must also be distributed to employees, while asset for the contract-out portion must be
paid to the Employee Pension Fund Association. To avoid this disbursement to employees, the
put-back of the contract-out portion was recognized by the new law. Put-back relieves the
employer of the foregoing burdens. It also enables a plan sponsor to record one-time profits
on the income statement under the new accounting rule, since the amount of the reduced
benefit obligation for accounting purpose is larger than the amount of assets a sponsor is
required to pay back to the government.
15 The plan sponsors’ interests in this rule is very high,
and within six months after the enforcement, Employee Pension Funds approved of the put-
back numbered 154, including blue chips such as Toyota, Hitachi and NEC.
Easy approval of entry and exit from the contract-out system would However, result in
employers’ morale hazard and reverse selection, making necessary such measures as: (a) at
the time of put-back of contract-out as well as the time of creation or amalgamation of
Employee Pension Funds, the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare must check to ensure
that another contract-out (including an enrolment in other Employee Pension Funds) is not
approved to companies that have exercised their put-back option; or (b) the Minister limits the
period for the put-back, and for companies that have elected to continue contract-out no put-
back is approved in future.
                                                
14 In Employee Pension Funds, the company’s own design of supplemental benefits must be the same as those in the contract-
out portions.
15 In case of put-back, an asset amount equal to liabilities for the contracted-out portion must be returned to the government,
specifically the Government Pension Investment Corporation, instead of to the Employee Pension Fund Association.16
3.2 Reforms among Old Plans
There have been many examples in which the two issues raised in Section 2 above were
addressed by making amendments to existing retirement benefit plans, rather than adopting a
new type of plans based on the two laws enacted in 2001.
3.2.1 Reducing the Level of Retirement Benefits
A direct measure to decrease the burden of plans is the reduction of retirement benefits,
including pensions. Benefit reduction in pension plans has been approved since 1997,
provided that certain conditions are met, including agreement by labor and management and
the existence of management difficulties. Since fiscal 1997, the number of Employee Pension
Funds whose benefits have been reduced increased each year, from 7 to 16, 52 and 177 in
2000 and 114 in 2001. The most notable pattern has been pension plan’s reduction of the
annuity amount by lowering the assumed rate of interest for the conversion of lump-sums to
annuities, without reducing the present value of benefit payments or the total amount of
retirement benefits as provided for in the labor contract.
Recently, there have also been an increasing number of cases where this reduction is not
limited only to pension amounts, but where the retirement benefits stipulated in the labor
contract are reduced. Practical methods to achieve this include: decreasing the amount of base
wage or the loading rate in cases of retirement benefits calculated by applying a loading rate
to the final wages; or reviewing the unit price of points or the schedule for granting points in
cases of the point-based benefits. Other methods common to the two types of plans include:
putting a maximum limit on the amount; or reducing additional benefits based on merits and
on age of retirement.
Of course, as it comprises a component of the labor contract, alteration of a contract for
retirement benefits requires an agreement between labor and management. In the current labor
market in which employers have the upper hand, however, it is difficult for employees to
reject benefit reductions.
3.2.2 Point-Based Retirement Benefits
Particularly noteworthy of late has been the introduction of point-based retirement benefits,
where the benefit amounts are calculated as the product of point price and accumulated points
granted each year for both pensions and severance payments.
16 Roughly 20 percent of large
companies have adopted this type of plans.
The design of this type of plans varies in the content of points, and the price per point. Under
the most popular design, points are granted both for the length of service (or age), and for
qualification (job capacity). In this case, inducements for long-term employment may be
achieved by structuring a steeply increasing scale of points to be granted from an employee’s
late 30s through about age 50, and/or increasing the point price according to age or length of
service rather than simply applying a flat price.
In most examples where this system has been adopted, however, the aim is to increase the
emphasis on employees’ performance and their evaluation, lessening the degree of the
seniority basis, and to allocate higher points for job content or performance rather than age or
                                                
16 In Employee Pension Funds, the rules governing the granting of points must be objective and rational. For example, the
largest points granted for the same length of service should be less than tenfold of the smallest points. Under the new
Defined Benefit Corporate Pension Plan Law, the conditions similar to this are assessed.17
length of service. For example, this could be done by granting points for job qualification only,
or setting points each year based on the evaluation of employee’s performance. This type of
design differs from the traditional system of linking benefits to final wages at the time of job
termination. Instead, wages and annual salaries during mid-career, which are dependent on
performance and job content, are reflected in the benefit amounts.
3.2.3 Advanced Payment Option
Another alternative to lighten the burden is to give the advanced payment option to employees,
in which employees can select between retirement benefits and their annual cash added to
wage. The increments to wages are generally calculated so that the sum of the payment
amount and the assumed interests on them are equal to retirement benefits. In most cases the
increment is a flat amount or a certain proportion of wages.
This system has principally two effects in labor management : if advanced payment is selected
there is no deferred portion, making annual compensation explicit and certain; and if the
advanced payment option portion is a flat amount or in proportion to wages, it is difficult to
backload the payment schedule. Hence, the seniority nature of traditional retirement benefits
is to be reduced. .
Also, incremental wages are paid annually during employment, thus facilitating self-planning
for old age. Companies with an increasing number of mid-career employees from outside
have been adopting this system.
This system is not without its problems: it decreases inducements to continue employment,
thereby raising the risk of losing qualified staff. In addition, when a company is forced to
apply disciplinary termination, it does not have the ability to reduce or forfeit retirement
benefits, and it also loses the ability to differentiate benefits between voluntary and
involuntary terminations. Of course, companies have the option of availing only a portion of
retirement benefits for advanced payment option, retaining the remainder as a tool to cope
with the above mentioned problems.
Another issue is tax payment. As is explained in section 4.2, lump sum payment of retirement
benefits falls under the retirement income deduction, and for pensions the pension benefit
deduction may apply. If paid in advance and included in wages, however, this will be subject
to income and inhabitants taxes, and further will be subject to social security tax calculations.
Forcing these negative factors upon employees would effectively reduce benefits.
From a financial aspect, advanced payments have the effect of reducing liabilities—reserves
for retirement allowances on balance sheets and alleviate investment risks as well. It, however,
burdens the companies with increased and regular cash out flows for advanced payment.
3.2.4 Elimination of Retirement Benefits
There has recently been a gradual increase in cases where retirement benefits have been
eliminated entirely. One is the elimination of the company pension system by dissolution or
cancellation, which have continued to increase in both Employee Pension Funds and Tax
Qualified Pension Plans. The deterioration of investment return has been cited as a principal
factor for this. As for Employee Pension Funds, an additional incentive has been escaping the
burden of contract-out.
When a company pension is eliminated, there are two options available for dealing with
traditional retirement benefits. One is to leave the benefits defined in the labor contract as
they are, making and reverting them an in-house book reserve. In this case, amount distributed18
to an employee from pension reserve is usually subtracted from the total sum of retirement
benefits stipulated in the labor contract.
The other way of dealing with retirement benefits is to eliminate the retirement benefits
altogether, not to mention company pension plans. Most companies take the course of
distributing accumulated pension assets to employees, with the future service portion added to
wages. This is equivalent to giving all employees the advanced payment,
17 since retirement
benefits are entirely absorbed into wages. This measure has been consistent with
compensation reforms that remove emphasis from seniority and deferred payment and place it
on employee’s merits and performances, It also has the effect of making the benefits and
compensation easily understood and freely used by employees. From a financial perspective,
it is possible to get rid of the volatility in benefit obligations recorded on balance sheets and in
expenses and cash outflows caused by interest rate movements.
3.3 Section Summary
Table 11 summarizes the foregoing explanation. Reforms in retirement benefits are evaluated
from three points in labor management: reducing the burden of personnel expenses; reducing
the importance of seniority and tending to reward employees for performance and
contribution; and coping with changes in employment practices and diversification of
employee’s career.
<Please insert Table 11 here. >
One measure to reduce the burden of personnel expenses is a direct reduction. Although
defined contribution plans, advance payment of benefits, and cash balance plans will cope
with the changes in employment practices and career diversification by alleviating backloaded
benefit curve and instituting individual accounts, they will not always have bearing on
emphasizing performance and contribution. Elimination of benefit plans have effects of both
attaching importance to job content and performance and adapting to changes in employment
practices. The point-based benefit plans usually reduce the importance of seniority and
emphasize performance and contribution, and in some cases also reduce personnel expenses
and coincides with new employment practices and career diversification.
If a demarcation of financial burden can be made between cash burden and financial
obligations/expenses in accounting reports, a reduction of benefits will reduce both. Defined
contribution plans are usually said to reduce obligations and expenses, but that effect actually
depends on the amount of employer’s contribution. Rather, a measure that will ensure the
reduction of financial obligations and expenses is the cash balance plan. Although advance
payment or elimination of retirement benefits will also result in this reduction, it may lead to
increase the immediate cash burden.
4. Policy Issues
While reforms in retirement benefits are progressing quickly, there still have remained some
problems to be solved. Among them, issues relating to protecting the benefit rights, and to tax
systems, will be discussed below.
                                                
17 Examples of eliminations that have been reported in the media include Rock Field, Kazokutei, Watami Food Service,
Kineya (in the food service industry); Otsuka Furniture, Kyoto Kimono Yuzen (in distribution industry); Hirota Securities,
Matsui Securities, Sumida Corporation (in electrical equipment industry), and Seiko.19
4.1 Protection of Benefit Rights
The first issue is the protection of the right to receive retirement benefits, or benefit rights. In
many countries, rules to protect this right have been established, especially in defined benefit
plans, including: early vesting of benefits; non-forfeiture of past service benefits; and
obligations to secure sufficient funding and establishment of payment insurance systems.
In Japan, as a general law on retirement benefits, including the book reserve system, Article 5
of the Law for Ensuring Payment of Wages recommends such protection measures
18 as
obtaining bank guarantees or entering into trust contracts. For Employee Pension Funds, in
1997 minimum funding requirements for plan termination were established.
These measures have in reality been of little use for the protection of benefit rights. First,
Article 5 of the Law for Ensuring Payment of Wages is merely a best-effort clause, and only
21 percent of all companies, and 12 percent of companies with 1,000 or more employees,
have implemented measures to preserve severance payments required by the law. For example,
when a shoe manufacturer named Asahi Corporation went bankrupt and underwent corporate
reorganization in 1998, employees who agreed to retire as a way to reduce staff, as well as
those who remained with the company, had their respective benefits reduced by 40 and 50
percent respectively.
Furthermore, when an Employee Pension Fund or Tax-Qualified Pension Plan is established,
regardless of the funding condition of pension plans, an employer’s obligation under Article 5
is deemed to have been satisfied. The average funding ratio of Employee Pension Funds
against termination liabilities was, however, only 86 percent as of end of March 2001 and
should be much lower in March 2002.
An even more significant issue is that benefit reductions are legally allowed. Whether in
pension plans and severance payments, changes can be made to labor contracts for retirement
benefits, thereby reducing benefits, as long as certain conditions are fulfilled. Included in
those conditions are the employer’s financial troubles, rationale for changes, compensation,
and adequate explanation to participants. Moreover, with an adequate explanation and
employees consent, retroactive reductions of past service benefits are possible.
This point has not been changed by the April 2002 enforcement of the Defined Benefit
Corporate Pension Plan Law. Reductions of retirement benefits are recognized under
essentially almost the same conditions as in current Employee Pension Funds.
It is true that funding standards for continuation or plan termination have both been
established, and employers are obliged to make up for any shortfall within a specified
period.
19 Looking at enforcement orders and regulations in comparison with those in the U.S.,
however, the contribution amount required for recovery in case of any funding shortage is
relatively small, while the time required for recovery is somewhat long. For example, if plans
are funded to 80 percent of minimum funding requirement for plan termination, in the U.S. 22
percent of the deficiency must be funded annually. Under Japan’s Defined Benefit Corporate
Pension Law Enforcement Order, only 8 percent of the deficiency must be funded.
20
                                                
18 It is provided for to set up bank guarantees, trusts, mortgages, or collateral against 25 percent or more of retirement benefits
for voluntary job termination at the term-end, or to establish a retirement allowance protection committee. (Law for
Ensuring Payment of Wages, Implementation Rules, Article 5-2).
19 On the contrary, if the funding level rises above a pre-determined level, there is a contribution holiday where all or part of
the contribution is suspended.
20 In the U.S., the ratio of required contribution to unfunded liabilities is calculated as the result of multiplying the funding
ratio in excess of 60 percent of the obligation at termination (current liabilities) by 0.4 and subtracting this product from 3020
The root of this problem lies in the thinking that prevailed in Japanese management that
retirement benefits constituted merit-based compensation rather than deferred wages. If
reduction of past service obligations are allowed under defined benefit plans, however,
opportunistic actions or morale hazard by employers may be tolerated, causing deterioration
of economic efficiency and welfare. Defined benefit plans should ensure payments of benefits
that accrued in the past. A strict application of the funding standards may be a means to
achieve this.
If a company wishes to share business risks with its employees, i.e., adjust benefits in
accordance with employer performance or financial conditions, it can choose a method of
adjusting cash compensation such as bonuses and wages. If individual employees reflect such
ups and downs of compensation to the amount they contribute to defined contribution plans,
the same effect as the changes in company retirement benefits reflecting business performance
can be achieved. As will be discussed below, this response can be made by establishing an
individual tax-exempt limit for annual contributions to all types of plans.
4.2 Taxation Suitable for Diversified Employment Practices
The second issue is the tax system. We examine taxation at three points of time, i.e.
contributions, investments, and benefit payments.
As is shown in Table 12, taxation rule for Japanese retirement benefits is fragmented and
inconsistent and much complicated.
<Please insert Table 12 here. >
In Employee Pension Funds, Tax Qualified Pension Plans, and the new defined benefit
company pension plans created under the new law, an employer’s contribution can be
expensed for tax purposes. Under the book reserve system, 20 percent of required retirement
benefit amounts for voluntary retirement at term-end (in the process of being reduced from
the historical 40 percent to 20 percent over six years, beginning from 1998) could be provided
tax-free, and within this range the provision amount could be expensed for tax purposes. This
tax free provision, however, is due to be eliminated over four years from 2003, as a measure
to expand the tax basis as a quid pro quo for the decrease in tax revenue that is caused by the
introduction of consolidated taxation system. For employee contributions, only Employee
Pension Funds are eligible for social insurance premium deductions. Under other systems a
life insurance premium deduction is applicable to employee contributions. In the latter case,
combined with premiums for other life insurance contracts, annual maximum amount eligible
for the deduction is 100,000 yen, being much smaller than EPFs, of which the upper limit is
2.7 times employee’s contribution for the contracted-out portion
In Employee Pension Funds, investment income from asset provision to pay company’s own
supplemental benefits is exempted from taxation, as long as the asset provision is below 1.7
times of asset to pay contract-out portion, and so is the investment income for contract-out
portion. The rationale for deduction is that the supplemental as well as contract-out portion
falls under the supervision of the Minister of Health, Labor and Welfare, and have a public
nature. On the other hand, systems, a special corporation tax
21 of 1.173 percent is assessed in
                                                                                                                                                        
percent. Thus, if the funding ratio is 80 percent, the annual contribution will be: 30% – 0.4 x (80% – 60%) = 22%. Under
Japan’s Defined Benefit Corporate Pension Law Enforcement Principles, Article 58: “An amount resulting from adding one
150th of Minimum Funding Standard to one-tenth of the differential between shortfall amount and 10% of the Minimum
Funding Standard” should be additionally contributed. Thus, if there is the same 20 percent shortfall, ((20% - 10%) X 0.1 +
1/150)) ÷ 20% = 1.67%÷ 20%  ʹ8.3% of the shortfall is the required annual funding.
21 While under Tax Qualified Pension Plans premiums are expensed when making contributions, levying income tax on asset21
other types of pension plans, although this taxation is suspended until March 2005
22. As for
the book reserve plan, income derived from reserve is naturally taxed as income of an
employer.
Finally, with respect to benefits, if received in lump sum, a ¥400,000 severance income
deduction is allowed for each year of service for the first 20 years, and a deduction of
¥700,000 for each succeeding year after 20 years is allowed. If an employee works for one
company 40 years, and receives 30 million yen as lump sum benefits, she can deduct 22
million (=20 yearsʷ¥400,000ʴ20 yearsʷ¥700,000 ) from 30 million yen as taxable income.
Then 50% of that 8 million yen (=30millionʵ22million)is taxed separately from other
taxable incomes.
If received as pension, the pension benefit deduction is applied. The amount of this deduction
is the total of a flat amount and a fixed percentage of benefit portion exceeding that amount. If
combined with other deductions applicable to the aged people, and if both members of a
household are over the age of 65, up to 3.49 million yen, including public pension benefits
will be free from annual taxes.
As a result, in Employee Pension Funds, there are no or little taxes on employer and employee
contributions, or investment incomes. Benefits are applicable to pension benefit deduction.
This situation, where none of contributions, investment incomes or benefits is fully taxed can
be abbreviated as “EEE,” standing for “exempt, exempt, exempt.”
Also, at the core of these taxation issues lies the fact that although all retirement benefits are
paid as one component of compensation and the function of being the preparation for the old
age is the same, tax treatment differs depending on the form of payment and type of plans.
For instance, regardless of contribution amounts, employer contributions to a defined benefit
plan can be fully expensed, and are not included employees taxable income. In a company
type defined contribution plan, however, an upper limit of 432,000 yen per year is assessed. In
case individuals make contributions to an individual-type defined contribution plan from their
wages, the upper limit is now 180,000 yen. Employees to whom an employer’s retirement
benefit system is not applied—such as part-time workers—are subject to this 180,000 yen tax
deduction; employees who have selected advanced payment of retirement benefits (in
companies that have adopted it) as wages are also subject to this limit.
There are also inequities in benefits received when changing jobs at mid-career. Currently,
since the special corporation tax is suspended, investment income in all company pensions is
non-taxable. However, it is only when funds are paid from and transferred between defined
contribution plans that investment income on lump sum benefits received on leaving an
employer continues to maintain tax-exempt status. Investment income is taxable if benefits
are received from all other types of plans. If a severance payment from a book reserve system
or lump-sum payment of a defined benefit plan is received, even if saved as retirement
income, benefits in excess of the retirement income deduction is taxable, as is the investment
income.
To resolve this problem, one of two specific rules should be applied universally to all plans
irrespective of forms of payment: one is to make contributions and investment income tax-
exempt, but make benefits received taxable (EET); the other one is to make contributions and
investments taxable, but make benefits tax-exempt (TTE). The choice would then be an issue.
                                                                                                                                                        
distribution to each member must be deferred until the time of benefit distribution. This is a tax to adjust for this timing lag
(of this, 0.173 percent is the special inhabitant tax).
22 Government has suspended this tax since April 1998, rolling over every two years.22
Considering the aging population and declining birth rate are straining the financial status of
the public pension system, there will be demands that company and individual pension plans
supplement old age income security. The appropriate option is therefore to give incentives to
private preparation by deferred taxation through EET— tax-free contribution and investment
income, with taxable benefits .
One desirable way to achieve this is to establish an individual tax-exemption limit for annual
contributions to all plans, in preparation for retirement until the age of 65. Whether the fund
source is wages, other form of compensation, or pension contributions, or whether an
employer or an individual makes contributions , the amounts within this limit will be
recognized as an income deduction or as taxable expenses. In addition, in either defined
benefit or contribution plans the contribution to company pensions by companies will be
allowed within this limit. If the annual contribution limit is 500,000 yen, and the company
makes a 300,000 yen contribution to a defined contribution plan, employees as individuals
can make tax-exempt contributions up to a maximum of the remaining 200,000 yen.
Using this system, employees of small and medium scale companies which do not have
company pension plans, or part-time or temporary workers who are not eligible for company
pensions even if such plans exist, or younger workers or frequent job hoppers who cannot
expect much from retirement benefits, are able to have opportunities to take advantage of tax
–exempt retirement plans.
Further, if there is an unused limit in any year, deferment should be allowed. If the limit is not
used at all until retirement, 30 or 40 years worth of contributions can be made out of
severance payment . Thus, elimination of the current retirement income deduction will not act
unfavorably, even for those facing imminent retirement. There are also some who request the
raising of the existing annual contribution limit of 432,000 yen in defined contribution plans.
If such deferment is allowed, however, even current annual limit would be substantially
sufficient to cover both current severance payments and pension contributions. At the same
time, as a course of EET principle, annuity payments which has been eligible for pension
benefit deduction will come to be taxed. One of the models for this type of taxation is
Canada’s Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP).
An issue for the introduction of this system will be the conditions to approve EET, which is a
favored treatment not applicable to other ordinary types of savings. One of those requirements
in defined benefit plans is to maintain funding level sufficient to ensure benefits. With respect
to the content of benefits, annuities would be ideal to hedge against the risk of longevity.
Considering the possibility of adverse selection, however, annuity payments should not be
mandated. For inflation indexation, it would be prudent to await the issuance of inflation-
indexed government bonds.
One technical issue is identification to record and control tax-exempt contribution limits. This
can be resolved by using a basic pension number in the same way as currently used for
administering the contribution limit in defined contribution plans. Another issue is the
allocation of employer’s contributions in defined benefit plans to individual participants tax-
exempt limit. It is inevitable to adopt a relatively simple calculation method using average
accrual benefits similar to that used for RRSP so that each individual can compute and control
her own contribution amounts with ease.
4.3 Other Issues
Among other policy issues regarding retirement benefits, an important one is their relationship
to public pensions. Amidst concerns being voiced about the financial uncertainties23
surrounding public pensions, the wide use of company and individual pensions for old age
income security is becoming widespread, from such Latin American countries as Chile, to
Europe, including the UK, Sweden, and Germany. Following their lead, discussions have been
intensifying on Japan’s use of a private sector retirement benefit plans to supplement public
pensions.
Depending upon the degree of such necessity, the range of applicability of preferential tax
treatment, and the amount or conditions of the preference, will vary. If individually separate
pensions are used, as in Sweden or Germany, improvement in disclosures or education about
investment products and inherent risks are necessary. Also, the level of fees charged for asset
investment or management will need to be kept at reasonable levels.
Another issue is to administer and manage plans in a fair and efficient manner. In Japan, the
concept of fiduciary responsibility is beginning to make inroads into retirement benefit plans,
particularly in company pensions. The obligation to exercise due care and obligation for
loyalty, and the obligation to disclose information, will likely play an important role in
maintaining fairness between employers and employees, as well as between investment
managers and pension plans.
Retirement benefit plans must, as a matter of course, be operated efficiently. Although it may
not be according to the original intent, fiduciary responsibility has also been playing a role in
contributing to that efficiency. For example, fiduciary responsibility set an obligation for
disclosure or explanation of tasks that have been entrusted. This works to prevent fiduciary’s
morale hazards and opportunism arising from the asymmetry of information between
fiduciary and its counterpart.
23
Rules regarding fiduciary responsibility will not of themselves ensure the retirement plan’s
complete efficiency. This is similar to that a director’s fiduciary responsibility alone will not
achieve efficient management of a stock corporation. In order to achieve efficiency,
governance over company pensions, particularly over their management, will be recognized
as a major issue. Just as in the selection of corporate executives, an important issue would be
how plan executive managers will be selected and dismissed if necessary, how they will be
evaluated, and what sort of incentives should be provided to them.
5. Summary
This paper has discussed the functions of and changes in retirement benefits in Japanese labor
management. With the caveat that the applicability of the retirement benefits system covers
less than half of the overall workforce, the benefits amount of full-time employees of large
corporations, which forms an S-shaped curve as the length of service increases, had been used
as a tool to control the tenure and termination of employment. In addition, since benefits were
originally a one-time payment from internal book reserves, in many cases benefit payments
have been made in a lump sum, even when pension plans with externally accumulated assets
had been established.
With the recent increase in term-defined and part-time employees, and with increased job
changing, resulting from causes that include corporate restructurings, labor management that
                                                
23 In this sense, fiduciary responsibility has the effect of supplementing the private contract. Legal experts in England and the
United States disagree, with some saying that fiduciary responsibility differs from a contractual relationship, while others
argue that fiduciary responsibility should be regarded as a legal system that operates under an entirely different set of
circumstances than contract law. The explanation here is closer to the former interpretation.24
falls outside the realm of the long-term employment model has increased. Further, with the
introduction of the new accounting standards for treatment of retirement benefits from fiscal
2000, liabilities and costs arising from benefit plans have also placed pressures on companies.
Facing such circumstances, companies have begun to take measures, which include the
reduction of retirement benefits amount and the adjustment of benefit formula. In the latter
case, companies try to reflect individual employee’s performance and job contents instead of
the length of service in the benefit formula. Some companies have also begun to introduce
defined contribution plans or cash balance plans (under the Defined Contribution Pension
Law and Defined Benefit Corporate Pension Plan Law, both enacted in 2001). Others decided
to exercise the “put-back” of contract-out portions. There are also companies that provide
employees with the option to of whether to receive retirement benefits, or to receive the same
amount in their wages. There are even companies that have eliminated retirement benefits in
themselves.
Amidst the companies’ probing not only retirement benefits, but also the personnel and
employment strategy , retirement benefits will in the future become diversified, depending on
the differences in companies’ personnel policies or characteristics of its business models and
nature of jobs.
In the public policies to address these trends, issues such as protection of the benefit rights
and the funding of defined benefit plans, and the introduction of tax rule that is neutral with
respect to the selection of plan and compensation type, will need to be addressed.
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Table 2： Coverage by Employer-Sponsored Pension Plans in the U.S. （%）




　  Employer with 1,000+ employee 71.7
（Source）"Retirement Plan Participation," EBRI Notes, January 2001, Vol. 22, number 1.
Employee Benefit Research Institute
Table 1： Portion of Retirement Benefits Paid in Lump Sum (1997, %）
① Percentage by plan type
Book reserve  Funded pension Combination
47.5 20.3 32.2
② Portion in funding
40%* of total funds is paid from pension plans' funding when in combination
＝ 47.5% + 32.2% × 60% ＝ 67%
＝ 20.3% + 32.2% × 40% ＝ 33%
③ Lump-sum benefits paid from pension plans
Percentage of pensions allowing lump-sum payment 89.8%
Percentage of beneficiaries selecting lump-sum payment
All-in lump sum 58.6%
Partial lump sum 10.2%
Percentage of lump-sum benefits in pension plans ＝ 89.8％ × (58.6％ + 10.2％ × 0.5） ＝ 57.2％**
④ Percentage of lump-sums in total retirement benefits
67.0% + 33% × 57.2% ＝ 85.9％
* Arithmetic average of college, high-school, and junior high-school graduates.
** Assumption is that 50 percent of benefits are paid in lump sum when beneficiaries select partial lump sum.
（Source） For percentage by plan type and lump-sum payment, General Survey on Wages and Working Hours System,
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 1998. 
For portion of lump-sum in combination plans, Comprehensive Survey of Wages and Retirement Benefits,
Central Labor Commission, 1999.
Benefits paid from book reserve
Benefits paid from funded pension27
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Chart 1： Amount of Retirement Benefits by Tenure














Age ＲＡ Ｗ Ｌ (=R/W) A/W
23 73 73.0 243.3 0.3 0.30
25 213 66.8 236.7 0.9 0.28
27 455 112.8 267.6 1.7 0.42
32 1,562 194.9 347.1 4.5 0.56
37 3,715 358.7 427.0 8.7 0.84
42 7,735 645.7 515.7 15.0 1.25
47 13,380 831.2 586.8 22.8 1.42
52 21,725 1170.4 662.3 32.8 1.77
55 25,224 480.3 685.4 36.8 0.70
60 27,295 -366.6 583.2 46.8 -0.63
（Source） Same as Chart 1.
Note： Amounts of benefits only for ages in the left (age) column are revealed in statistics
 by the Central Labor Committee.
When numbers at age "t" and "t+5" are revealed, amounts at "t+1" through "t+4" are calculated, 
so that equations
R=Wt×Lt,　Rt+1=Rt(1+r)+At+1, and At+1=At+2=At+3=At+4=At+5 hold true.
Amount (thousand yen）28
Table 4： Changes in Labor Distribution Rates (%)







All  industries Manufacturing Non-
manufacturing
1970s ① 67.5 67.8 67.2 56.0 60.0 50.1
1980s ② 70.6 71.0 70.3 57.7 62.8 51.2
1990s ③ 72.5 74.3 71.5 62.5 68.6 56.6
Year 2000 ④ 73.2 73.7 73.0 60.7 65.7 55.9
③－① 5.0 6.4 4.3 6.4 8.6 6.5
（Source）  Statistical Yearbook of Corporations (Ministry of Finance)
All corporations


















Periods A BC ≒B-A D E≒C-D
All scales
① to ② 4.87 10.82 6.26 5.04 1.23 3.18
② to ③ 2.93 3.93 1.06 1.59 -0.53 2.44
③ to ④ 0.19 2.91 2.73 1.29 1.44 1.96
④ to ⑤ 0.86 0.66 -0.20 -0.57 0.37 0.07
Corporations with paid-in capital over 1 billion yen
① to ② 4.79 10.83 6.30 5.04 1.26 2.05
② to ③ 2.67 4.19 1.56 1.59 -0.03 3.07
③ to ④ -1.33 1.98 3.36 1.29 2.08 3.20
④ to ⑤ 2.59 1.57 -0.98 -0.57 -0.41 -0.28
Manufacturing corporations with paid-in capital over 1 billion yen
① to ② 5.59 11.06 5.74 3.94 1.80 1.55
② to ③ 3.93 4.50 0.61 0.69 -0.08 1.43
③ to ④ -0.52 1.99 2.54 -0.13 2.67 2.19
④ to ⑤ 6.42 2.74 -3.45 -2.43 -1.02 -1.76
Non-manufacturing corporations with paid-in capital over 1 billion yen
① to ② 3.89 10.33 6.68 6.19 0.49 3.04
② to ③ 1.20 3.68 2.51 2.15 0.37 5.61
③ to ④ -1.34 1.95 3.36 1.69 1.67 4.45
④ to ⑤ 0.00 0.37 0.37 0.10 0.27 1.35
Contribution is calculated based on the differential between the following periods:
① 1960-74 （Rapid economic grwoth）④ 1992-1994 （Depression after bubble-burst）
② 1975-1986 （Low-growth period after first oil crisis）⑤ 1995-2000 （Deflationary period）
③ 1987-1991  （Bubble period）
　　　（Source）　　　Labor allocation and number of employees, Annual Statistics on Corporations (Ministry of Finance);
value-added deflator, National Income Statistics （Cabinet Ministry）.29
Table 6： Portion of Employees Age 50+ in Corporations with Over 1,000 Employees
（%）
Age 50-59 And tenure of
over 30 years
A BB / A
1977 4.3 0.8 17.5
1987 8.5 2.4 28.5
1997 11.7 5.1 43.1
2000 14.5 5.7 39.3
1977 1.6 0.3 17.8
1987 7.0 2.5 36.3
1997 13.1 8.3 63.4
2000 15.9 11.4 72.0
（Source）Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Basic Survey of Wage Structure.
College graduates （all industries）
High school graduate production workers（manufacturing）
Chart 2-1: Total Wage Profile by Age (College graduates)*
* Indexing total of fixed salary and bonus received by those working at a single employer after grauduation.
(Source) Basic Survey of Wage Structure 2001, 1988

















Chart 2-2: Total Wage Profile by Age (High　school　graduate　production workers)*
*  Indexing total of fixed salary and bonus received by those working 
in manufacturing　industry at a single employer after graduation.






















Cash & deposits 3.7 3.9 3.4 4.2
Funds entrusted with Trust
Fund Bureau
0.8 0.9 0.0 0.0
Loans 2.8 3.0 2.4 3.0
Securities other than stocks 37.1 39.6 29.4 36.5
Stocks and equity 25.9 27.7 23.8 29.6
Derivatives 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Foreign investment 21.4 22.9 19.6 24.4
Total (including others) 93.7 100.0 80.6 100.0
Corporate pensions consist of EPFs and TQPs.
*Additionally included here are national pension funds, and employees retirement
 　allowance mutual aid and smaller enterprises retirement allowance.
(Source）Flow of Funds Account （Bank of Japan）
Pension funds for
private sector
Chart ３： Return of Assets Managed by EPFs (%)





1986 to 90 6.5 1.3 5.2
1991 to 95 5.0 0.8 4.2
1996 to 2000 1.5 0.2 1.2
1991 to 2001 3.1 0.4 2.8













































































Fiscal year ending March 2001
Total 8,761 73.9 39.9 34.0 23.2 10.8 10.7 7.5% 57.2% 7.4% 56.6%
N=1024 （per employee, million yen） (8.4) (4.6) (3.9) (2.6) (1.2) (1.2)
Manufacturing industry 6,308 49.7 28.6 21.1 13.7 7.4 7.0 8.2% 66.2% 7.7% 61.9%
N=653 （per employee, million yen） (7.9) (4.5) (3.4) (2.2) (1.2) (1.1)
Non-manufacturing　industry 2,453 24.2 11.4 12.8 9.5 3.4 3.8 6.2% 44.0% 7.0% 49.0%
N=371 （per employee, million yen） (9.9) (4.6) (5.2) (3.9) (1.4) (1.5)
Fiscal year ending March 2002
Total 8,618 78.2 39.2 38.9 24.6 14.4 6.2 10.0% 122.6% 4.3% 52.9%
N=1024 （per employee, million yen） (9.1) (4.6) (4.5) (2.9) (1.7) (0.7)
Manufacturing industry 6,141 52.4 27.7 24.7 14.7 10.0 3.7 11.1% 214.3% 4.1% 79.2%
N=653 （per employee, million yen） (8.5) (4.5) (4.0) (2.4) (1.6) (0.6)
Non-manufacturing　industry 2,477 25.8 11.5 14.3 9.9 4.4 2.5 8.1% 62.3% 4.6% 35.6%
N=371 （per employee, million yen） (10.4) (4.7) (5.8) (4.0) (1.8) (1.0)
Year to Year Comparison
Total -1.6% 5.7% -1.8% 14.6% 6.1% 32.8% -42.2% 2.5% 65.5% -3.1% -3.7%
N=1024 （per employee, million yen） (7.5%) (-0.2%) (16.5%) (7.9%) (35.0%) (-41.2%)
Manufacturing industry -2.6% 5.4% -3.1% 16.8% 7.5% 34.0% -47.0% 2.9% 148.1% -3.6% 17.3%
N=653 （per employee, million yen） (8.3%) (-0.4%) (20.0%) (10.4%) (37.7%) (-45.6%)
Non-manufacturing　industry 1.0% 6.4% 1.3% 11.0% 4.2% 30.0% -33.2% 1.9% 18.3% -2.3% -13.3%
N=371 （per employee, million yen） (5.4%) (0.3%) (9.9%) (3.2%) (28.8%) (-33.9%)
(Source) NLI Research
(Trillion yen)
Year to Year Change Year to Year Change
Table 9： Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Firms' Financial Statements under Financial Accounting Standard 87






（ten billion yen）（ one hundred
million dollars）
（ten billion yen）（ one hundred
million dollars）
（ten billion yen） 10 billion yen
Projected benefit obligation （PBO) ① 830 134 255 175 562 116 51
Fair value of plan assets　　　 ② 875 87 502 99 734 79 31
Net shortage of funds (45) 46 (247) 76 (172) 37 20
PBO　recognized on balance sheet (136) 22 (94) 35 (69) 26 ＮＡ
（Accrued Pension Costs）
Service cost 12 6 7 5 10 5 2
Interest cost 53 4 18 6 37 4 2
Expected return on plan asset 73 3 34 3 56 3 1
Net pension and severance cost　　③ (16) 9 (14) 10 (8) 94
Total asset＊１,2　④ 2,747 490 4,052 570 875 461 225
Equity capital　　　⑤ 206 193 426 98 194 98 78
Net Income　　　　⑥ 60 26 107 (3) 77 1 5
Number of employees（ten thousand ） 38.8 11.2 34.0 19.1 29.1 15.5 6.7
②／① 105% 65% 197% 56% 131% 68% 61%
①／④ 30% 27% 6% 31% 64% 25% 23%
①／⑤ 402% 69% 60% 178% 289% 118% 66%
PBO　per employee（$10,000：￥１mil.） $214,000 11.9￥million $75,000 9.2￥million $193,000 7.5￥million 7.6￥million
（$10,000：￥１mil） ($4,000) 0.8￥million ($4,000) 0.5￥million ($3,000) 0.6￥million 0.6￥million
③／⑤ (8%) 5% (3%) 10% (4%) 9% 5%
③／⑥ (27%) 35% (13%) (361%) (10%) 850% 82% *
*77% if we exclude companies with losses
ʢSourceʣFinancial statements of companies: US corporations, December 1999; Japanese corporations, March 2000
19 manufacturing corporations: Nippon Meat Packers, Wacoal, Fujifilm, Komatsu, Kubota, Toshiba, Mitsubishi Electric, Makita, Omron, 
NEC, Sony, ̩̙̠, Sanyo Electric, Pioneer, Kyocera, Murata, Honda Motor, Canon, Ricoh
*1ɹˈ149.2 billion of total assets, ˈ11.3 billion of shareholders equity, and $1.5 billion of net income in GM are related to financial and insurance businesses.
*2ɹˈ303.3 billion of total assets, ˈ19.8 billion of shareholders equity, and $4.4 billion of net income in GE are related to GE Capital.32
Chart 4：　 Change in Company Pension Structure under
 the New Defined Benefit Corporate Pension Plan Law
＜Before the Law＞＜ After New Defined Benefit Corporte Pension Law＞
Employee Pension Funds Employee Pension Plans
Fund Type Defined Benefit Plans
Contract Type Defined Benefit Plans
Tax Qualified Pension Plans Defined Contribution Plans









123 52.8 35 88
110 47.2 57 53
TQPP 65 27.9 28 37
Book reserve lump sum 23 9.9 14 9
Combination of the above two 17 7.3 10 7
EPFs 3 1.3 3 0
Combinationof TQPP and EPF 1 0.4 1 0
Combination of three 1 0.4 1 0
92 141
Number of Plans
over 300 300 or less





Employees Less than 100
100～299
Sum of the above two
300～99933
                                                











Defined contribution plans －△ ○ ○ － △
Defined benefit plans －－ － － － －
（Contract-out Portion）
Cash balance plan －△ ○ ○ － ○
Reduction of benefits ○－ － － ○ ○
Advance payment
(including employee's
choice) －△ ○ ○ × ○
Elimination (termination)
of benefit plans －○ ○ ○ × ○
Point-based benefit plans △△ △ － － －
Meaning of each sign
○ Strong  effect
△ Effect with exceptions
－ No effect
Effects on human resource management
Adoption to changes in employment
practices





and expenses in financial
statements
Table 12：Current Tax Provision for Retirement Benefits
Lump sum
Company pension
(EPF, TQP, new DP plan, company DC plan)
Individual Pension
(life insurance, individual DC plan)
・
・
・ For life insurance annuities, income
deduction applies to contributions up
to \100,000/year
・ Retirement income
deduction applies at time
of payment
・ For individual DC plan, income
deduction applies to contributions up
to \180,000/year
・ Amount of deduction is
\400,000/year for first




Employees' Pension Fund is non-taxable **
Other corporate pensions are subject to special
corporate tax (that remains frozen through March
2004)
・ Life Insurance is subject to ordinary
income tax, while individual DC
plan is subject to special corporate
tax (that remains frozen through
→・
   
・
Treated as misc. income; pension benefit
deduction applies
Retirement income deduction applies to lump sum
・ For individual DC plan, retirement
income deduction and/or pension
benefit deduction applies.
Notes: *  No maximum for defined benefit plan. Maximum for corporate DC plan is ¥216,000 if
another DB plan exists, and ¥432,000 if not.
**  However, the tax exemption applies only to gains generated from assets up to 2.7 times
the assets necessary to pay contract-out benefit.
*** For the National Pension Fund, individual contributions and investment gains are
nontaxable, and the pension deduction applies to benefits.
Corporate contribution is treated as expense *
Social insurance premium exemption applies to
personal contributions to EPF; life insurance
premium exemption applies to other DB plans
Tax is levied on one-half
of gross income less
deduction
Contributions
Investment gains
Withdrawal (Payment)***